This paper reviews a new framework for analyzing the interrelationship between inequality, unemployment, labor market frictions, and foreign trade. This framework emphasizes …rm heterogeneity and search and matching frictions in labor markets. It implies that the opening of trade may raise inequality and unemployment, but always raises welfare. Unilateral reductions in labor market frictions increase a country's welfare, can raise or reduce its unemployment rate, yet always hurt the country's trade partner. Unemployment bene…ts can alleviate the distortions in a country's labor market in some cases but not in others, but they can never implement the constrained Pareto optimal allocation. We characterize the set of optimal policies, which require interventions in product and labor markets.
Introduction
For understanding the causes and consequences of international trade, recent research has increasingly focused on individual …rms. While this research emphasizes reallocations of resources across heterogeneous …rms, it typically assumes frictionless labor markets in which all workers are fully employed for a common wage. In reality, labor markets feature both unemployment and wage inequality, and labor market institutions are thought to play a prominent role in propagating the impact of external shocks. In this paper, we draw on recent research in and Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010) , to discuss interdependence across countries.
This framework incorporates a number of features of product and labor markets. Firms are heterogeneous in productivity, which generates di¤erences in revenue across …rms. There are search and matching frictions in the labor market, which generate equilibrium unemployment, and give rise to multilateral bargaining between the …rms and their workers. While workers are ex ante homogeneous, they draw a match-speci…c ability when matched with a …rm, which is not directly observed by either the …rm or the worker. Firms, however, can invest resources in screening their workers to obtain information about ability. Larger, more-productive …rms, screen workers more intensively to exclude those with low-ability. As a result, they have workforces of higher average ability and they pay higher wages. These di¤erences in …rm characteristics are systematically related to export participation. Exporters are larger and more productive than nonexporters; they screen workers more intensively; and they pay higher wages in comparison to …rms with similar productivity that do not export. The resulting framework highlights a new mechanism through which trade a¤ects inequality, based on variation in wages across …rms and the participation of only the most-productive …rms in exporting.
We use a simpli…ed version of this framework to examine interdependence across countries through labor market frictions. Cross-country di¤erences in labor market characteristics shape patterns of comparative advantage. A reduction in a country's labor market frictions in the di¤er-entiated sector reduces unemployment within that sector and expands the share of workers searching for employment there, which a¤ects aggregate unemployment through a change in sectoral composition. Depending on the relative values of unemployment rates across sectors, aggregate unemployment may rise or decline. The expansion in a home country's di¤erentiated sector increases its welfare, but enhances the degree of product market competition faced by foreign …rms, which leads to a contraction in the foreign country's di¤erentiated sector and a reduction in its welfare.
Unilateral labor market reforms, therefore, can have negative externalities across countries, whereas coordinated reductions in labor market frictions raise welfare in every country.
As well as providing a platform for analyzing the positive economic e¤ects of trade and labor market characteristics, our framework can be used to address normative issues. We …rst examine the impact of unemployment bene…ts on resource allocation and welfare, and show that they raise welfare in some circumstances and reduce welfare in other. We also present new results on policies that implement a constrained Pareto optimum. When the Hosios (1990) condition is satis…ed, these policies do not require intervention in the labor market. Otherwise, a combination of subsidies to the cost of posting vacancies/hiring, subsidies to output/employment, and a common subsidy to all …xed costs (entry, production and exporting) implement the constrained Pareto optimal allocation.
These product market policies apply equally to exporting and nonexporting …rms. Unemployment bene…ts can be part of the optimal policy package under some circumstances, but even then more direct interventions in the labor market are preferable on informational grounds.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the motivation for our approach and some of the related literature. In Section 3 we use the framework of Helpman, Redding and Itskhoki (2010) to examine the relationship between inequality, unemployment and trade. In Section 4 we use a simpli…ed version of this model from to explore how changes in labor market frictions in one country a¤ect its trade partners and how the removal of trade impediments a¤ects countries with di¤erent labor market frictions. Section 5 extends the analysis to provide new results on the impact of unemployment bene…ts and on optimal policies. Section 6 concludes.
Background and Motivation
Traditional explanations of international trade have emphasized comparative advantage based on variation in technology across countries and industries (Ricardo 1817) or the interaction between cross-country di¤erences in factor abundance and cross-industry di¤erences in factor intensity (Heckscher 1919 , Ohlin 1924 , Jones 1965 and Samuelson 1948 . In the 1980s, economies of scale and monopolistic competition were merged with factor proportions-based explanations for trade in Dixit and Norman (1980) , Helpman (1981) , Krugman (1981) and Lancaster (1980) . While economies of scale and love of variety preferences together generated two-way trade within industries, as observed empirically, the assumption of a representative …rm implied that all …rms exported.
More recently, …rm heterogeneity has been introduced into general equilibrium trade theory following Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) . The resulting models of …rm heterogeneity and trade provide a natural explanation for empirical …ndings from micro data that only some …rms within industries export and these exporters are larger and more productive than nonexporting …rms. Table 1 reports some representative evidence on export participation from the World Trade Organization (2008) . In each of the countries considered, only a minority of …rms export. Furthermore, even within exporters, there is tremendous heterogeneity in productivity and size. As reported in Table 2 , the top 1 percent of …rms account for 81 percent of U.S. exports and a substantial percentage of exports in all countries.
Country
Year This new theoretical literature on …rm heterogeneity and trade emphasizes the self-selection of more-productive …rms into exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result of this self-selection, reductions in trade costs have uneven e¤ects across …rms, as low-productivity …rms exit and high-productivity …rms expand to serve foreign markets. The resulting changes in industry composition raise aggregate productivity, consistent with empirical …ndings from trade liberalization episodes, as reported in Pavcnik (2002) and Tre ‡er (2004) . Firm heterogeneity and selection also in ‡uence cross-section patterns of trade and FDI. For example, the ratio of exports to foreign subsidiary sales depends not only on the trade-o¤ between proximity and concentration, but also on the dispersion of …rm productivity, as shown in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Yeaple (2009) . Similarly, the decision whether to o¤shore stages of production within or outside the boundaries of the …rm is systematically related to …rm productivity, as shown theoretically in Evidence on the magnitude of cross-country di¤erences in labor market institutions is presented in Our analysis builds on a long line of research on trade and labor market frictions. This literature has considered a number of di¤erent sources of labor market frictions, including minimum wages (Brecher 1974) , implicit contracts (Matusz 1986 ), e¢ ciency wages (Copeland 1989 Our analysis focuses on search frictions as the source of labor market imperfections and is based squarely in the new view of foreign trade that emphasizes …rm heterogeneity in di¤erentiated-product markets. The discussion of inequality, unemployment and trade in Section 3 draws on Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010) , while the analysis of interdependence in labor market outcomes in Section 4 is based on . In Section 5, we present new results on the design of labor market policies in economies with …rm heterogeneity and labor market frictions. 1 
Inequality
The traditional framework for examining the distributional consequences of trade liberalization In this section we outline an alternative framework for examining the impact of trade on inequality from Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010) . In contrast to the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem's emphasis on reallocations of resources across sectors, the key predictions of this framework relate to the distribution of wages and employment across …rms and workers within sectors. We derive these distributions from comparisons across …rms that hold in sectoral equilibrium for any value of a worker's expected income outside the sector, i.e., his outside option. An important implication is that the predictions of our model for sectoral wage inequality hold regardless of general equilibrium e¤ects. Throughout this section, all prices, revenues and costs are measured in terms of a numeraire, where the choice of this numeraire depends on how the sector is embedded in general equilibrium, as discussed further in Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010).
Model Setup
We consider a di¤erentiated-product sector. Consumer preferences take the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form, and the real consumption index for the sector (Q) is
where j indexes varieties; J is the set of varieties within the sector; q (j) denotes consumption of variety j; and controls the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
There is a competitive fringe of potential …rms who can choose to enter this sector by incurring a sunk entry cost of f e > 0. Once the sunk entry cost is paid, a …rm observes its productivity , which is drawn from an independent Pareto distribution, G ( ) = 1 ( min = ) z for min > 0 and z > 1. Once …rms observe their productivity, they decide whether to exit, produce solely for the domestic market, or produce for both the domestic and export markets. Production involves a …xed cost of f d > 0 units of the numeraire. Exporting involves an additional …xed cost of f x > 0 units of the numeraire and an iceberg variable trade cost, such that > 1 units of a variety must be exported in order for one unit to arrive in the foreign market.
There is a continuum of ex ante identical workers, who choose whether or not to search for employment in the sector. The labor market is subject to search and matching frictions. Workers draw a match-speci…c ability a when matched with a …rm in the di¤erentiated sector. This matchspeci…c ability, which is observed neither by the worker nor the …rm, is drawn from an independent Pareto distribution, G a (a) = 1 (a min =a) k for a a min > 0 and k > 1.
The output of each …rm variety (y) depends on the productivity of the …rm ( ), the measure of workers hired (h), and the average ability of these workers ( a):
where this production technology can be interpreted as capturing either human capital complementarities (e.g., production in teams where the productivity of a worker depends on the average productivity of her team) or a managerial time constraint (e.g., a manager with a …xed amount of time who needs to allocate some time to each worker). A key feature of this production technol-ogy is complementarities in worker ability, where the productivity of a worker is increasing in the abilities of other workers employed by the …rm.
Search and matching frictions in the labor market are modelled following the standard DiamondMortensen-Pissarides approach. A …rm that pays a search cost of bn units of the numeraire can randomly match with a measure of n workers, where the search cost b is endogenously determined by the tightness of the labor market x:
This search technology can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas matching function; is a parameter that is increasing in the cost of posting vacancies and decreasing in the Hicks-neutral e¢ ciency of the matching process; is the ratio of the Cobb-Douglas coe¢ cients on the number of workers searching for jobs and vacancies; and the tightness of the labor market, x = N=L, is the ratio of the measure of matched workers, N , to the measure of workers searching for employment in the di¤erentiated sector, L.
Once matched with workers, …rms can invest resources in screening them to obtain an imprecise signal of match-speci…c ability. By incurring a screening cost of ca c = , where c > 0 and > 1, a …rm can identify those workers with an ability below a c , but cannot determine the abilities of the individual workers with any greater precision. We focus on interior equilibria in which c is su¢ ciently small that all …rms screen their workers.
The timing of decisions is as follows. Firms and workers decide whether or not to enter the di¤erentiated sector. The outside option of …rms is zero. The outside option of workers is expected income in other employment, !, where workers are assumed to be risk neutral and ! is determined in general equilibrium. After incurring the sunk entry cost for the di¤erentiated sector, …rms learn their productivity and choose whether to exit or produce. If …rms choose to produce, they post a measure of vacancies and choose whether to serve only the domestic market or also export. Workers are next matched with …rms. Unmatched workers become unemployed and receive unemployment bene…ts of zero. Firms screen their n matched workers by choosing a screening threshold a c . Only workers with abilities above the screening threshold are hired and those with abilities below the screening threshold become unemployed. The …rm and its h hired workers engage in multilateral bargaining over the division of the surplus from production as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) . Finally, output is produced and markets clear.
Firm' s Problem
Given the speci…cation of di¤erentiated-sector demand, the equilibrium domestic-market revenue of a …rm can be written as
where A is a demand-shifter, that is increasing in total expenditure on varieties within the sector, E, and in the sector's ideal price index, P , which summarizes the prices of competing varieties.
If a …rm exports, it allocates its output between the domestic and export markets to equate its marginal revenues in the two markets, so that total …rm revenue can be expressed as
where
exporting; y d ( ) is output for the domestic market; y x ( ) is output for the export market; and
The variable ( ) captures a …rm's "market access," which depends on whether it chooses to serve both the domestic and foreign markets or only the domestic market:
where I x ( ) is an indicator variable that equals one if the …rm exports and zero otherwise.
The solution to the bargaining game implies that the …rm receives a share 1= (1 + ) of revenue, while each worker receives a wage equal to a constant share of revenue per worker:
Anticipating this outcome of the bargaining game, a …rm chooses the measure of workers to match with, n, the screening threshold, a c , and whether or not to export to maximize its pro…ts:
max n 0; ac a min ; Ix2f0;1g
where y is a derived parameter and we have used the properties of the Pareto distribution of worker ability. The latter implies that a …rm choosing a screening threshold a c hires a measure h = n (a min =a c ) k of workers with average ability a = ka c =(k 1). Firms of all productivities have an incentive to screen for 0 < k < 1 and su¢ ciently small values of c.
As a result of …xed costs of production and exporting, a …rm's decision whether or not to produce and export takes a standard form. Only the most-productive …rms with productivities and the least-productive …rms with productivities < d exit. The …rm's market-access variable is therefore determined as follows:
x ;
Using the …rst-order conditions to the …rm's problem (6), closed-form solutions for all …rm-speci…c variables can be derived:
More-productive …rms have larger revenues, match with more workers, and screen to higher ability thresholds. As a result they have workforces of higher average ability and pay higher wages. As long as screening costs are su¢ ciently convex and worker ability is su¢ ciently dispersed, > k, The wage schedule as a function of productivity is illustrated for particular parameter values in Figure 1 . Although more-productive …rms pay higher wages, they also screen more intensively, which implies that they hire a smaller fraction of their matched workers. Using the solution to the bargaining game and the …rm's …rst-order conditions, the higher wages of more-productive …rms are exactly o¤set by the lower probability of being hired, since the Stole-Zwiebel bargaining solution implies that a …rm's equilibrium wage is equal to its replacement cost for each worker. As a result, the expected wage conditional on being matched is the same across all …rms:
which implies that workers have no incentive to direct their search across …rms of di¤ering productivities.
Labor Market Equilibrium
Worker indi¤erence across sectors requires that expected income in the di¤erentiated sector is equal to workers'outside option, !, where expected income in the di¤erentiated sector equals the probability of being matched, x, times the expected wage conditional on being matched, b:
This indi¤erence condition across sectors and the search technology (3) together determine the equilibrium tightness of the labor market and hiring costs as a function of workers'outside option:
where ! is determined in general equilibrium, as considered in Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010).
Implications for Wage Inequality
Since wages and employment in (8) This result highlights a new mechanism for international trade to a¤ect wage inequality: the participation of some but not all …rms in exporting. This mechanism applies in any heterogeneous…rm model in which …rm wages are related to …rm revenue and there is selection into export markets.
Our result holds whenever the following three conditions are satis…ed: …rm wages and employment are power functions of …rm productivity, there is …rm selection into export markets and exporting increases wages for a …rm with a given productivity, and …rm productivity is Pareto distributed. An important implication of this result, which applies for symmetric and asymmetric countries alike, is that the opening of trade can increase wage inequality in all countries. This result is therefore consistent with empirical …ndings of increased wage inequality in developing countries following trade liberalization. Similarly, our result is consistent with empirical evidence that much of the observed reallocation in the aftermath of trade liberalization occurs across …rms within sectors and is accompanied by increases in within-group wage inequality.
Since sectoral wage inequality in an open economy in which all …rms export is the same as in a closed economy, but sectoral wage inequality in an open economy in which only some …rms export is higher than in a closed economy, it follows that the relationship between sectoral wage inequality and the fraction of exporters is at …rst increasing and later decreasing. The intuition for this result is that the increase in …rm wages that occurs at the productivity threshold above which …rms export is only present when some but not all …rms export. When no …rm exports, a small reduction in trade costs that induces some …rms to start exporting raises sectoral wage inequality because of the higher wages paid by exporters. When all …rms export, a small increase in trade costs that induces some …rms to stop exporting raises sectoral wage inequality because of the lower wages paid by domestic …rms.
Implications for Unemployment
While we have so far focused on the distribution of wages across employed workers, income inequality in this framework also depends on the unemployment rate. Workers can be unemployed either because they are not matched with a …rm or because their match-speci…c ability draw is below the screening threshold of the …rm with which they are matched. The sectoral unemployment rate u includes both of these components and can be written as one minus the product of the hiring rate and the tightness of the labor market x:
where H=N , H is the measure of hired workers, N is the measure of matched workers, and L is the measure of workers seeking employment in the sector.
As shown above, equilibrium labor market tightness, x, depends on worker's outside option, !, which can either remain constant or rise following the opening of trade, depending on how the sector is embedded in general equilibrium (see Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding 2010). In contrast, the hiring rate, , is unambiguously lower in the open economy than in the closed economy, since the opening of trade reallocates employment within industries towards more-productive exporting …rms, which screen more intensively and hire a smaller fraction of the workers with whom they are matched. Furthermore, this reduction in the hiring rate can dominate an increase in labor market tightness, so that the opening of trade not only increases wage inequality but also raises unemployment.
Although the opening of trade can increase both wage inequality and unemployment, it also reduces the CES ideal price index for the di¤erentiated sector. Therefore, despite increasing social disparity, the opening of trade raises the expected welfare of risk-neutral workers.
Multiple Worker Types
Our main results on the impact of trade on wage inequality can be generalized to settings in which there are multiple types of workers with di¤erent observable characteristics. To illustrate, suppose that there are two types of workers, indexed by`= 1; 2. There are separate labor markets for each type of worker, which are modelled as above, where the magnitude of search frictions can vary across worker types. Within each group of workers there is heterogeneity in the match-speci…c ability, a`, which is not observable. As a result, workers of a given type`are ex ante homogeneous but ex post heterogeneous, as for the case of a single type of worker discussed above.
Let the distribution of ability of type-`workers be Pareto with shape parameter k`> 1 for = 1; 2, and let the production function be
Then Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010) show that wage inequality is larger within each group of workers in an open economy in which only a fraction of …rms export than in a closed economy.
Moreover, for k 1 < k 2 , more-productive …rms employ relatively more workers of type-1-with the larger ability dispersion-and pay them relatively lower wages. The relatively larger number of type-1 workers in higher-productivity …rms weakens these workers' relative bargaining power, which translates into relatively lower wages. As a result, there is less wage dispersion among type-1 workers.
Importantly, while trade raises wage inequality within every group of workers, it may raise or reduce wage inequality between the two groups. Yet even if trade reduces wage inequality between the groups, overall wage inequality may still rise as a result of the increase in wage inequality within each group of workers with similar observable characteristics.
Interdependence
Having examined the impact of trade on sectoral inequality and unemployment, we now discuss interdependence between trading countries in a simpli…ed version of the framework from the previous section. As in , in the simpli…ed framework there is no heterogeneity in match-speci…c ability and no worker screening. We address the following questions: How do labor market frictions impact interdependence across countries? And, in particular, what are the impacts of a country's labor market frictions on its trade partners?
Analytical Framework
For the purpose of addressing these questions, we consider a two-country world, say countries A and B, in which every country has the same technology in each one of two sectors. One sector produces varieties of a di¤erentiated product while the other manufactures a homogeneous good.
Preferences are quasi-linear, given by
where q 0 is consumption of the homogeneous good, Q is the real consumption index of the di¤eren-tiated product, and we choose the homogeneous good as the numeraire. As before, controls the elasticity of substitution across varieties, and the new parameter controls the elasticity of substitution between the homogeneous good and the di¤erentiated product. We think of U as the utility level of a family consisting of a continuum of workers of measure one. There exists a continuum of such families of measure L. As a result, there are L workers in this economy. Each family chooses the allocation of family members across sectors to maximize family utility. Since the idiosyncratic risk faced by individual workers as a result of random search and matching is perfectly diversi…ed across the continuum of workers within each family, each family behaves as if it is risk neutral.
The homogeneous good is produced according to a constant returns to scale technology, with one unit of labor required to produce one unit of output, and the homogeneous good is costlessly traded. The technology of the di¤erentiated sector is a simpli…ed version of the technology from the previous section, with no worker heterogeneity and no screening. In this case the production function of every variety is
where, as before, is the …rm's productivity and h is its employment. Varieties in the di¤erentiated sector are again subject to iceberg trade costs, where > 1 units must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive in the other country.
There are labor market frictions in each sector, similar to the labor market frictions described in the previous section. In the homogeneous sector the cost of hiring is
The derived parameter 0 is larger the higher the cost of vacancies is and the less e¢ cient is the matching process in the homogeneous sector. Moreover, in equilibrium w 0 = 1= (1 + ) and
, where is the relative bargaining weight of the employer in the wage bargaining process (see Appendix). 3 As a result,
and equilibrium tightness in the homogeneous sector's labor market, x 0 , is decreasing in the level of labor market frictions in this sector, 0 . The cost of hiring in the di¤erentiated sector is given by (3). The two countries, A and B, di¤er only in labor market frictions ( 0 ; ). That is, they di¤er either in the sectoral levels of the e¢ ciency of matching or in the costs of posting vacancies, which determine the equilibrium levels of the frictions ( 0 ; ).
In equilibrium, workers are indi¤erent between searching for jobs in the homogeneous or the di¤erentiated sector, which implies that their expected income is the same in each sector, x 0 b 0 = xb. Together with the search technology, this condition implies the following values of the wage rate, the cost of hiring, and labor market tightness in the di¤erentiated sector in each country j, independently of the trade regime:
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume A = 0A > B = 0B , which implies b A > b B ,
i.e., labor market frictions in the di¤erentiated sector are relatively larger in country A.
Trade and Welfare
Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) show that under these circumstances a larger fraction of di¤erentiated-product …rms export in country B, and that country B exports di¤erentiated products on net and imports homogeneous goods. Since the only di¤erence between the two countries is in their labor market frictions, it follows that this pattern of trade is determined by di¤erences in labor market frictions across countries; the country that has the relatively lower level of labor market frictions in the di¤erentiated sector exports di¤erentiated goods on net. Moreover, in this world economy the share of intra-industry trade is smaller the larger the gap in relative hiring costs b A =b B is.
Another interesting result is that both countries gain from trade, in the sense that a representative family's utility level U is higher in the trade equilibrium than in autarky. Since the idiosyncratic risk faced by individual workers is perfectly diversi…ed within families, the expected utility of every worker is higher in the open economy than in autarky. Furthermore the pricing distortion associated with monopolistic competition in the di¤erentiated sector implies that this sector is too small in the market equilibrium. Therefore, since the reduction in labor market frictions in the di¤erentiated sector in country j expands this sector at home and contracts this sector abroad, it raises welfare at home and reduces welfare abroad.
Interdependence in Labor Market Frictions
A simultaneous proportional reduction of A and B raises welfare in both countries, because it expands the size of the di¤erentiated sector in each one of them. On the other hand, a reduction in j and 0j at a common rate (which does not change the hiring cost b j ) raises country j's welfare and does not a¤ect the welfare level of its trade partner. This results from the fact that this type of reduction in labor market frictions does not impact competitiveness, yet it leads to higher aggregate utilization of resources in country j (see the discussion of unemployment below).
Trade Liberalization
Reductions of trade impediments, , raise welfare in both countries, because they also expand the size of the di¤erentiated sector in each country. Unlike the welfare consequences of lower trade frictions, however, the e¤ects on unemployment can di¤er across countries. A country's rate of unemployment equals a weighted average of its sectoral rates of unemployment-(1 x 0j ) in the homogeneous sector and (1 x j ) in the di¤erentiated sector-with weights equal to the shares of workers seeking employment in these sectors. In other words, country j's rate of unemployment is
where N 0j is the measure of workers seeking employment in the homogeneous sector and N j is the measure of workers seeking employment in the di¤erentiated sector, with N 0j +N j = L j . Since trade impediments do not impact sectoral rates of unemployment, because tightness in labor markets does not depend on trade frictions, the only channel through which reductions in can in ‡uence the rate of unemployment is through worker reallocation across industries. Therefore, if the rate of unemployment is higher in the di¤erentiated sector than in the homogeneous sector, aggregate unemployment rises as a result of the expansion of the di¤erentiated sector induced by lower trade frictions. And if unemployment is higher in the homogeneous sector than in the di¤erentiated sector, aggregate unemployment declines as a result of the expansion of the di¤erentiated sector induced by lower trade frictions. Moreover, (14) implies that the rate of unemployment is higher in the di¤erentiated sector if and only if it has higher labor market frictions than the homogeneous sector, i.e., j > 0j . show that lower trade frictions may impact the rates of unemployment in the two countries in the same direction or in opposite directions. Moreover, the rate of unemployment can be higher in country A for some levels of trade frictions and higher in country B for other levels of trade frictions. As a result, di¤erences in aggregate levels of unemployment do not necessarily re ‡ect di¤erences in labor market frictions; a country with more rigid labor markets may have a higher or lower rate of unemployment. Finally, since lower trade frictions raise welfare in both countries, but may raise the rate of unemployment in both or only in one of them, it is evident that the impact of lower trade frictions on unemployment provides no information on their impact on welfare; welfare goes up in both countries even when their rates of unemployment increase.
Unemployment and Labor Market Frictions
Of special interest is the relationship between labor market frictions and rates of unemployment.
This relationship is sharpest in the case of symmetric countries, which have the same levels of labor market frictions ( 0 ; ). In this case, Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) show that raising the common level of labor market frictions in the di¤erentiated sector raises the rate of unemployment in both countries if and only if = 0 is smaller than a threshold that exceeds one. It follows that whenever < 0 , i.e., labor market frictions are lower in the di¤erentiated sector, this condition is satis…ed and raising increases the rate of unemployment. This increase in the rate of unemployment occurs for two reasons: …rst, the sectoral rate of unemployment rises in the di¤erentiated sector; second, workers move from the di¤erentiated sector to the homogeneous sector and the latter has a higher sectoral rate of unemployment. Alternatively, when > 0 but = 0 is smaller than the threshold, higher frictions in the di¤erentiated sector raise the sectoral rate of unemployment which raises in turn the aggregate rate of unemployment. But now the movement of workers from the di¤erentiated to the homogeneous sector reduces aggregate unemployment, because the homogeneous sector has a lower rate of unemployment than the di¤erentiated sector. The former e¤ect dominates, however, as long as = 0 is below the threshold. Above the threshold higher frictions in the di¤erentiated sector's labor market reduce aggregate unemployment, because in this case the negative impact of worker reallocation across industries outweighs the positive impact of the rise in the rate of unemployment in the di¤erentiated sector. 4 When countries are not symmetric, the sectoral unemployment rate and labor force composition e¤ects interact in complex ways. For example, starting with > 0 and raising labor market frictions in country A's di¤erentiated sector can initially raise the rate of unemployment in both countries but eventually reduce it in country A, whereas it continues to raise the rate of unemployment in country B. As a result, A may have a higher rate of unemployment for low values of A but a lower rate of unemployment for high values of A , or it may have lower unemployment for all A > . Again, we encounter a case in which knowledge of relative rates of unemployment across countries is not su¢ cient to draw inferences about their relative levels of labor market frictions.
Policy Implications
We now use the framework of Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) from the previous section to derive new results on economic policies. Two key features of this framework are that the cost of hiring is a su¢ cient condition for the size of the di¤erentiated sector and that the di¤erentiated sector is too small in the market equilibrium because of the pricing distortion associated with monopolistic competition in this sector. In the previous section we considered changes in the cost of hiring that were induced by changes in labor market frictions in the form of lower costs of vacancies or more e¢ cient matching. In this section we examine how unemployment bene…ts-a prevalent labor market policy-a¤ect the cost of hiring and welfare. Although it remains the case that lower hiring costs in the di¤erentiated sector necessarily increase the size of this sector and welfare, unemployment bene…ts can either raise or reduce hiring costs in the di¤erentiated sector, and hence can either increase or decrease welfare. Furthermore, a key di¤erence between this policy-induced variation in the cost of hiring and the labor market frictions considered in the previous section is that unemployment bene…ts require …nancing through taxes. As a result, even if unemployment bene…ts reduce the cost of hiring in the di¤erentiated sector, they can have a non-monotonic e¤ect on welfare. In this case, the introduction of unemployment bene…ts can be welfare reducing, or it can be welfare improving up to a point and welfare reducing thereafter.
After discussing unemployment bene…ts in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, and the nature of the economy's distortions in Section 5.3, we examine in Section 5.4 policies that implement a constrained Pareto optimum. The focus on a constrained rather than an unconstrained optimal allocation stems from our desire to treat search and matching in the labor market as a constraint on economic activity that a social planner cannot remove, and she therefore cannot costlessly allocate workers to …rms.
We show that there exists a simple set of policies in labor and product markets that support such a constrained Pareto optimal allocation. This set of policies is not unique, because there exist alternative combinations of labor market and product market policies that can achieve the same end. One conclusion from this analysis is that there are cases in which unemployment bene…ts can play a useful role in the optimal policy design, but that there are also cases in which unemployment bene…ts are not congruent with e¢ ciency. Another conclusion is that optimal policies do not discriminate between …rms by export status; the same policies should be applied to exporters and nonexporters alike.
Unemployment Bene…ts
Unemployment bene…ts impact wages and the cost of hiring. Wages are a¤ected directly when workers bargain with employers, because in the presence of unemployment bene…ts b u -measured in units of the homogeneous numeraire good-the outside option of a worker in the bargaining game is b u instead of zero (we drop the country index in what follows). In addition, unemployment bene…ts a¤ect tightness in labor markets and thereby the incentives of workers to search for jobs in the homogeneous versus di¤erentiated sectors.
In the homogeneous sector the wage rate is now
the cost of hiring is
and tightness in the labor market (see Appendix for details) satis…es
which is the same as (13) when the unemployment bene…ts are equal to zero. Evidently, in this case higher unemployment bene…ts reduce x 0 and raise the sectoral rate of unemployment. And, as before, higher frictions in the labor market reduce x 0 . From (15) and (16) we obtain the expected income of a worker searching for employment in the homogeneous sector,
as a function of unemployment bene…ts. Moreover, ! is the outside option of workers searching for employment in the di¤erentiated sector. Therefore, in an equilibrium with positive employment in both sectors, ! also equals the expected income of a worker searching for a job in the di¤erentiated sector, and therefore ! = wx + b u (1 x).
In the di¤erentiated sector bargaining over wages yields a wage rate equal to the fraction = ( + ) of revenue per worker plus b u = ( + ) (in the absence of unemployment bene…ts the second component equals zero). Accounting for the …rm's pro…t-maximizing choice of employment and the requirement that the expected income of workers be the same in both sectors, we obtain
As a result, there is a proportional relationship between labor market tightness in the two sectors, and a change in unemployment bene…ts has the same proportional e¤ect on labor market tightness in each sector. In particular, higher unemployment bene…ts reduce tightness in both labor markets.
We also show in the Appendix that
Therefore unemployment bene…ts, b u , directly a¤ect the cost of hiring in the di¤erentiated sector and also have indirect e¤ects through labor market tightness, x. Higher unemployment bene…ts raise b directly because they increase workers' outside option in wage bargaining. But higher unemployment bene…ts reduce b indirectly because they reduce tightness in the labor market, x.
Equations (16)- (18) imply that higher unemployment bene…ts raise the cost of hiring, b, on net if and only if labor market frictions are higher in the homogeneous sector; that is, if and only if 0 > . 5 When labor market frictions are higher in the di¤erentiated sector, the di¤erentiated sector has a higher sectoral rate of unemployment than the homogeneous sector. Under these circumstances higher unemployment bene…ts reduce the hiring cost in the di¤erentiated sector and lead to its expansion, as more workers choose to search for jobs in this industry. In other words, unemployment bene…ts have an uneven e¤ect on sectoral employment, favoring the sector with higher unemployment. As a result, by raising unemployment bene…ts a country makes its di¤erentiated sector more competitive on world markets if this sector has the higher sectoral rate of unemployment, in which case this policy hurts the country's trade partner. Alternatively, by 5 Equations (16)- (18) can be used to derive a closed-form solution for the hiring rate:
from which this result is transparent. 
Unemployment Bene…ts and Welfare
The next question is whether a country gains from raising its unemployment bene…ts. Figure 2 shows that the answer depends on structural features of the labor market. The …gure depicts percentage changes in welfare, measured on the vertical axis, in response to changes in the level of unemployment bene…ts, measured as a replacement ratio of the homogeneous sector's wage rate, b u =w 0 . It describes simulations of a closed economy in which labor market frictions are higher in the di¤erentiated sector. 6 In this case higher unemployment bene…ts always reduce the equilibrium cost of hiring in both sectors. Yet for high values of , welfare …rst rises in unemployment bene…ts and eventually declines, while for low values of , welfare always declines in unemployment bene…ts.
It follows that when is large welfare is maximized at a positive level of unemployment bene…ts, while the optimal level of unemployment bene…ts equals zero when is small.
To gain further insight into these results, Figure 3 decomposes the changes in welfare that result from unemployment bene…ts for the case = 1:2. The North-Western panel describes the contribution of the di¤erentiated sector to welfare, Q , and the contribution of income net 6 The following parameters were used in the simulations described in Figures income rises initially as long as the rise in !L is larger than the rise in taxes T needed to …nance the unemployment bene…ts, and declines eventually. As a result, the welfare curve W has a hump shape. The North-East panel shows that not only do taxes rise with unemployment bene…ts, they also rise as a fraction of net income, T =E. In addition, the fraction of workers searching for jobs in the di¤erentiated sector, N=L, rises. Finally, rising unemployment bene…ts reduce tightness in both sectors' labor markets, as shown in the South-West panel of the …gure (which also shows the rise in !). 7 As a result, higher unemployment bene…ts raise sectoral rates of unemployment.
Since workers also move from the homogeneous to the di¤erentiated sector, which is the higher unemployment rate sector, aggregate unemployment rises with unemployment bene…ts.
Product and Labor Market Distortions
An interesting implication of the example depicted in Figure 3 is that unemployment bene…ts are bene…cial up to a point despite the fact that they raise unemployment. Yet if we were to reduce in this example to a su¢ ciently low level, we would …nd that unemployment bene…ts raise unemployment and reduce welfare. The question is why. To understand the answer, …rst note that in this type of economy there are multiple distortions. To begin with, the di¤erentiated sector is too small, because it prices goods with a markup above marginal cost and there is too little entry into the industry. For this reason unemployment bene…ts that reduce the cost of hiring in the di¤erentiated sector and induce a reallocation of workers from the homogeneous to the di¤erentiated sector, bene…t the economy. On the other side, in this example tightness in the labor market is too high initially and unemployment bene…ts bring it down. This is illustrated in the South-East panel of Figure 3 for the homogeneous sector, in which the horizontal dashed line x H 0 describes the optimal level of tightness, and the vertical dashed line shows the welfare-maximizing unemployment bene…ts policy. For low levels of unemployment bene…ts x 0 is too high, while for high levels of unemployment bene…ts it is too low. For this reason raising unemployment bene…ts from an initially low level reduces distortions in labor markets by reducing labor market tightness, and this raises welfare. But when initial unemployment bene…ts are high, the levels of tightness in the labor markets are too low and further increases in unemployment bene…ts aggravate the labor market distortions, which may reduce welfare.
There are no distortions in the labor market when the Hosios (1990) condition is satis…ed, which in our case is = 1 (i.e., the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the number of vacancies equals the weight of employers in the bargaining game). While the Hosios condition was derived in models with linear revenue and single-job …rms, we extend this condition to a model with monopolistic competition, multiple-job …rms, and Sole and Zwiebel (1996) style multilateral bargaining. When the Hosios condition holds, or 1, unemployment bene…ts always magnify the distortions in the labor markets, which reduces welfare. But because they reduce the distortion in the intersectoral allocation of labor (when they increase N ), unemployment bene…ts may initially raise welfare on net. When is very low, however, the distortions in the labor markets are so high that even small unemployment bene…ts reduce welfare on net.
To understand the link between the Hosios condition and labor market distortions in this model, consider the following experiment. Suppose we want to employ H workers in the di¤erentiated sector, but we cannot allocate them directly to …rms; all we can do is instruct N workers to search for jobs in the di¤erentiated sector and the remaining L N workers to search for jobs in the homogeneous sector. How many vacancies do we need to open in each sector in order to secure the employment of H workers in the di¤erentiated sector at minimum cost to the economy?
Instead of working directly with vacancies we can instead choose levels of tightness in the sectoral labor markets, x 0 and x. Naturally, in this case we need to send N = H=x workers to search for jobs in the di¤erentiated sector, which leaves L H=x workers searching for jobs in the homogeneous sector. However, only a fraction x 0 of the latter workers …nd employment in the homogeneous sector, producing (L H=x) x 0 units of the homogeneous good. The cost of …lling up (L H=x) x 0 vacancies in the homogeneous sector is (L H=x) x 0 0 x 0 , because the cost of hiring is 0 x 0 per worker. And the cost of …lling up H vacancies in the di¤erentiated sector is H x , because the cost of hiring is x per worker in the di¤erentiated sector. Consequently, the net output of homogeneous goods-which can be used for consumption or for entry of …rms in the di¤erentiated sector-equals 8
Given H, the optimal levels of x and x 0 maximize this measure of net output. The solution to this problem does not depend on H, however, and it can be characterized by
and (17) . When these conditions are satis…ed, the ratio x=x 0 is at the optimal level independently of H or the level of unemployment bene…ts. Comparing (16) with (19), we see that levels of labor market tightness are optimal in the absence of unemployment bene…ts if and only if = 1.
Moreover, if < 1, x 0 is too small without unemployment bene…ts and it moves further away from the optimal level the larger the unemployment bene…ts are. If, on the other hand, > 1, there exists a positive level of unemployment bene…ts at which the levels of tightness in the labor markets are optimal. In the South-East panel of Figure 3 this happens at the intersection point with the horizontal dashed line, where x 0 = x H 0 . However, the level of unemployment bene…ts that secures the optimal levels of labor market tightness does not maximize welfare, because it leaves distortions in the allocation of labor across sectors (the optimal levels of unemployment bene…ts are depicted in this …gure by the dashed vertical lines). If, for example, the di¤erentiated sector has a higher rate of unemployment than the homogeneous sector, then it is optimal to raise b u above the level that maximizes the net output of homogeneous goods, because this would attract more workers to the di¤erentiated sector and thereby partially o¤set the monopolistic distortion that reduces the size of the di¤erentiated sector 9 . Evidently, since this economy has multiple distortions, multiple instruments are needed to attain e¢ ciency. These instruments are discussed in the next section.
Optimal Policies
We now consider policies that implement a constrained Pareto optimal allocation. The objective is to maximize the joint welfare of countries A and B, which-in view of the utility function (12)-is given by X j=A;B
The constraint is that the planner can allocate workers to industries but not to …rms. However, the planner can post vacancies for every …rm and thereby determine the probability with which vacancies are …lled in every industry.
The Appendix contains an explicit formulation and solution to the planner's problem. This solution satis…es the labor market tightness conditions (17) and (19) in every country, for the reasons explained in the previous section. Therefore, if = 1, no intervention is required in the labor markets, despite the fact that the frictions 0 and di¤er across countries. If, however, 6 = 1, then it is necessary to design labor market policies in the country in which the Hosios condition is not satis…ed in order to implement the optimal allocation. Importantly, a country's optimal labor market policies depend only on its labor market parameters and . 10 A direct policy that eliminates the labor market distortions is a subsidy or tax to the hiring cost, which is 9 The impact of unemployment bene…ts on the relative size of sectors is similar in our case to Acemoglu and Shimer's (1999) analysis of policies that maximize output, except that in their case the distortion results from the reluctance of risk-averse workers to search for jobs in high-unemployment sectors. In their case aggregate output is too small without policy intervention, while unemployment bene…ts encourage workers to take the risk of searching for jobs thereby raising output. See also Acemoglu (2001) , in which the composition of jobs in the market equilibrium is ine¢ cient, and unemployment bene…ts and minimum wages can raise welfare through changing job composition. 1 0 In the main text we assume that the relative bargaining weight is the same in both sectors, although it may vary across countries. In the Appendix we allow to vary across sectors also. equivalent to a subsidy or tax to the cost of posting vacancies. 11 When the subsidy rate to hiring in the homogeneous sector is s b 0 (possibly negative), the resulting tightness in this labor market
Comparing this condition to (19) we see that x 0 is optimal if and only if
Evidently, hiring has to be subsidized in the homogeneous sector when < 1 and taxed when > 1. For < 1, …rms post too few vacancies and labor market tightness is too low. The required hiring subsidy is decreasing in the relative weight of job-seekers in the matching technology,
, and in the relative weight of the employer in wage bargaining, . For > 1, …rms post too many vacancies and labor market tightness is too high, which implies that a hiring tax is required.
In this latter case, optimal labor market tightness can also be achieved with unemployment bene…ts, but unemployment bene…ts cannot correct the labor market distortion when < 1. 12 A similar labor market policy is required in the di¤erentiated sector, with the rate of subsidy the same in the two sectors:
With the optimal labor market subsidies in place, there are no remaining distortions in labor markets. But the relative size of the two sectors is not optimal. To correct the distortions in the relative size of the two sectors the planner can subsidize sales of the di¤erentiated product. A subsidy of s r per unit of sales in terms of the numeraire raises the revenue of every manufacturer, and the optimal subsidy is
The …rst term on the right hand side, (1 ) = , represents the subsidy that o¤sets the distortion that results from the markup of price over the marginal cost (the monopolistic distortion), while the second term, = (1 + ), represents the subsidy that o¤sets the distortion that results from wage bargaining. The total subsidy is increasing in the relative weight of employers in wage bargaining 1 1 Note that a correction of this distortion requires a labor market policy that encourages job creation through lower costs of matching. For example, it cannot be a direct employment subsidy, because this policy does not reduce the matching costs to …rms. Moreover, an employment subsidy is equivalent to a subsidy to the …rms'revenues. 1 2 In this case bu < 0 is required, which means taxing the unemployed.
( ) and decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the di¤erentiated product ( ). A higher elasticity of substitution reduces the manufacturers'market power and thereby their markups above marginal costs, which leads to expansion of output and employment and implies that a lower subsidy to sales is required. The relative weight of employers in wage bargaining a¤ects the value of the subsidy, because in the Stole-Zwiebel bargaining game …rms have an incentive to hire more workers than is socially optimal in order to reduce the wage paid to infra-marginal workers,
i.e., this bargaining mechanism leads to overemployment. This overemployment distortion partially o¤sets the e¤ect of monopolistic pricing that makes the di¤erentiated sector too small. The subsidy increases with the relative weight of employers in wage bargaining, because a larger value for this weight reduces the overhiring distortion, and hence reduces the size of the di¤erentiated sector, which implies that a larger subsidy is required to restore the size of the di¤erentiated sector to its socially optimal level.
In addition to the subsidy to sales, in the di¤erentiated sector the …xed costs of production, export, and entry have to be subsidized at a common rate, equal to
This subsidy is decreasing in the relative weight of employers in wage bargaining ( ), because of the overhiring distortion in the Stole-Zwiebel bargaining game discussed above. Note that this subsidy does not depend on , because the markup does not distort entry.
Importantly, the same optimal policies in the di¤erentiated sector apply to all …rms. In other words, they equally apply to low-and high-productivity …rms, and to exporters and nonexporters alike. This means that the optimal policies do not discriminate between …rms based on productivity, size, or export status.
We show in the Appendix that the optimal policies in product markets depend on whether subsidies or unemployment bene…ts are used in the labor market. If the social planner uses unemployment bene…ts in the labor market, which are feasible when > 1, then the subsidies to sales and to …xed plus entry costs in the di¤erentiated sector depend not only on and but also on the frictions in the labor markets, 0 and . For this reason, the optimal policies based on subsidies, discussed above, require less information than policies that rely on unemployment bene…ts.
The impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality and unemployment and the role of labor market institutions in shaping the e¤ects of trade liberalization are areas of intense policy debate.
Until recently, the ability of research in international trade to engage with this policy debate has been hampered by the widespread assumption of ‡exible labor markets and the associated prediction of full employment at a common wage.
In this paper, we have reviewed a new framework that combines …rm heterogeneity in the product market with search and matching frictions in the labor market to examine the economy's response to trade. The resulting framework highlights a new mechanism for international trade to a¤ect wage inequality: when only some …rms export, the increase in wages that occurs at the productivity threshold for exporting raises wage inequality across …rms. This mechanism accounts for the empirical …ndings of rising wage inequality in both developed and developing countries following trade liberalization and rationalizes rising wage inequality among groups of workers with the same observed characteristics. While the opening of trade can raise social disparity through both higher wage inequality and higher unemployment, expected welfare necessarily rises.
The introduction of labor market frictions into a general equilibrium model of trade permits the study of interdependence in labor market institutions across countries and the analysis of interactions between labor market institutions and trade liberalization. While labor market reforms that reduce search and matching frictions in the di¤erentiated sector increase a country's own welfare, they reduce welfare in its trade partners. The aggregate unemployment rate depends on both the unemployment rate within each sector and the composition of the labor force across sectors. In consequence, policies that reduce the unemployment rate within the di¤erentiated sector need not reduce aggregate unemployment if they also change the composition of the labor force across sectors. One important implication is that relative aggregate unemployment rates across countries are not, in general, fully informative about relative levels of labor market frictions.
In our setting with multiple product and labor market distortions, the market allocation is not constrained e¢ cient. Only if the Hosios condition is satis…ed, which requires the relative bargaining weight of employers to equal their relative weight in the matching technology, is the e¢ cient level of labor market tightness attained. More generally, if the Hosios condition is not satis…ed, subsidies to hiring costs or the costs of posting vacancies or unemployment bene…ts can be used to achieve the e¢ cient level of labor market tightness. However, with several distortions in product and labor markets, unemployment bene…ts alone cannot achieve the constrained e¢ cient allocation and their introduction can either raise or reduce welfare. To achieve the constrained e¢ cient allocation requires a combination of these interventions in the labor market and subsidies to revenue and …xed costs in the product market. Notably, the e¢ cient subsidies in the product market take the same value for both exporters and nonexporters. Finally, the use of direct subsidies or taxes to hiring requires less information than unemployment bene…ts and avoids the limitation that unemployment bene…ts have to be non-negative.
Appendix
This appendix sets up the model for Sections 4 and 5 and derives the results reported in the text; the model is based on , with the addition of policy instruments.
We start by describing the decentralized equilibrium. We then set up the planner's problem and compare its solution with the decentralized allocation.
A Decentralized Equilibrium
We consider a decentralized equilibrium of the Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) model, allowing for nonsymmetric bargaining power of …rms and workers, unemployment bene…ts, subsidies and taxes to hiring costs, entry costs, …xed production costs, and …rm revenues in the di¤erentiated sector.
A.1 Labor market equilibrium
In Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) we showed how a Cobb-Douglas matching function results in the following hiring cost function in the homogeneous-good sector:
where 0 is the ratio of vacancy costs to the productivity of the matching technology, x 0 is the endogenous labor market tightness (equal to the probability of a worker …nding a job), and is the ratio of the Cobb-Douglas parameters on unemployment and vacancies. In words, b 0 is the (expected) cost for a homogeneous-good producer of matching with (hiring) one worker. Similarly, the cost of matching in the di¤erentiated sector is x , where we allow to di¤er from 0 .
Consider the homogeneous-good sector. Upon matching, the …rm and the worker produce one unit of the homogeneous good, which is our numeraire. They split this surplus via Nash bargaining.
The outside option is zero for the …rm and it equals unemployment bene…ts, b u < 1, for the worker.
In the process of bargaining, the surplus (1 b u ) is divided between the …rm and the worker according to their relative bargaining power, which we denote by 0 . This results in an operating pro…t level 0 and a wage rate w 0 :
With free entry, equilibrium pro…ts equal zero, and therefore the operating pro…ts equal hiring costs. That is,
where s b 0 is the hiring-cost subsidy. Combining this with the previous expressions, we obtain
which reduces to (16) when s b 0 = b u = 0 and = 0 . Finally, the expected income of workers in the homogeneous-good sector is given by
Next consider the di¤erentiated sector. We show below that the equilibrium wage in this sector
where is the relative bargaining power of …rms in this sector, s b is the sector-speci…c hiring-cost subsidy to …rms, is the sectoral labor market friction parameter (i.e., the ratio of vacancy costs to the productivity level of the matching technology), and x is the sector's labor market tightness (equal to the matching probability for workers). Therefore, a worker's expected income in the di¤erentiated sector is
In equilibrium workers have to be indi¤erent between searching for jobs in the homogeneous or di¤erentiated sectors, which requires ! 0 = !. The latter implies
Naturally, (17) is a special case of this condition, for 0 = and no hiring subsidies. Also note that as long as unemployment bene…ts are common to the unemployed in both sectors, they do not a¤ect relative labor market tightness in the two sectors. Conditions (20) and (21) pin down labor market tightness in the two sectors.
A.2 Product market equilibrium
In the di¤erentiated sector …rms solve the following maximization problem:
where h is employment, I x is the …rm's export status indicator, =(1 ) is a measure of the …rm's productivity, s r is the revenue subsidy rate, x is the hiring (matching) cost per worker, s b is the subsidy rate to hiring costs, f d is the …xed cost of production, f x is the …xed cost of exporting, s d is the subsidy rate to the …xed cost of production, and s x is the subsidy rate to the …xed cost of exporting. As shown in , the revenue function of a …rm in country j
where ( j) denotes the foreign country and we drop the subscript j from country j's variables.
Importantly, revenue is a power function of employment.
Wages are set via bargaining over revenue between the …rm and its workers. At the bargaining stage, entry costs, the export status, the …xed costs of production and export, and the hiring costs, are all sunk. We adopt Stole and Zweibel's (1996) bargaining game, which implies that the wage function satis…es the following di¤erential equation:
In words, the incremental surplus of the …rm from an additional worker equals the surplus of the worker weighted by the …rm's relative bargaining power. This di¤erential equation has the following solution:
Anticipating this bargaining outcome, the …rm's pro…t maximization problem becomes ( ) = max h 0;Ix2f0;1g
where its e¤ective hiring cost is
The solution of the …rm's problem can now be characterized in the following way. Optimal employment can be expressed as
Here h d ( ) represents employment needed to supply the home market while h x ( ) represents employment needed to supply the foreign market. The pro…t level can be similarly decomposed into pro…ts from domestic sales and pro…ts from export sales, ( ) = d ( ) + I x ( ) x ( ), where
See Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) for more detail. An immediate implication of (22)- (23) is that the solution to the wage-bargaining problem yields the equilibrium wage:
which is the same for all …rms, independently of export status or productivity.
A …rm's decisions as to whether to stay in the industry and whether to export can be characterized by two cuto¤ productivity levels d and x , which are implicitly de…ned by d ( d ) = 0 and
That is, …rms with productivity below d exit, …rms with productivity 2
serve the domestic market only, and …rms with productivity above x serve both the domestic and export markets. The two conditions d ( d ) = 0 and x ( x ) = 0 can be expressed as
Finally, free entry requires the entry cost net of the entry subsidy to equal expected pro…ts from domestic and export sales:
Using the expressions for optimal pro…ts and cuto¤s, this condition can be expressed as
Conditions (24)- (26) characterize product market equilibrium in the home country. Speci…cally, given x and Q ( j) , they allow us to solve for ( d ; x ; Q) for country j (recall that we have dropped the index j from the home country's variables). Similar conditions describe the foreign country's product market equilibrium. Jointly, the two countries' equilibrium conditions allow us to solve the cuto¤s and real consumption indexes ( dj ; xj ; Q j ) and ( d( j) ; x( j) ; Q ( j) ).
Finally, conditions (20)- (26), together with the parallel conditions for the foreign country, de-scribe the decentralized equilibrium allocation for the world economy, given labor and product market policies in the two countries. In this equilibrium the governments are assumed to have access to lump-sum taxes and transfers in order to …nance their policies. Under the circumstances we need not worry about the government's budget constraint as long as there is positive consumption of the homogeneous good, which is assured when L is large enough.
B Optimal Policies
The world planner's problem-constrained by search frictions-can be formulated as follows: where
and M j denotes the measure of di¤erentiated product …rms that enter in country j, and the other variables have been previously de…ned. The equation for Q j comes from the CES aggregator once we notice that 1 h dj ( ) = q dj ( ) , where q dj ( ) is consumption of a home variety produced in country j by a …rm with productivity , and similarly for imported varieties. The last term on the right hand side of the expression for q 0j represents total entry, production, and export …xed costs in terms of the homogeneous good, where 1 G( dj ) is the fraction of surviving …rms and 1 G( xj ) is the fraction of exporting …rms out of all entrants. The second term on the right hand side is the total hiring cost paid in the di¤erentiated sector, where H j is the total number of matches (employment) in this sector and j x j is the search cost per match. Finally, the …rst term is the output of homogeneous goods less search costs in the homogeneous-good sector (see the main text for a detailed discussion of the …rst two terms on the right hand side of the equation for q 0j ).
Consider the planner's optimal allocation in a world of two symmetric countries (most of the following results generalize to a world of asymmetric countries). In this case we need to consider the optimality conditions for x 0 ; x; h d ( ); h x ( ); d ; x ; M , which are common to both countries. ; which is implied by (20 P )-(21 P ). We can use the above equation in similar fashion to derive the other conditions. Equations (24 P )-(25 P ) obtain from the …rst-order conditions with respect to d and x after substituting in the expressions for h d ( d ) and hx( x) from (22 P )-(23 P ). Equation (26 P ) obtains through manipulation of the …rst-order condition with respect to M , which can be written as
Next substitute (22 P )-(23 P ) into the de…nition of Q and H which implies
Finally, combine the above two expressions with (24 P )-(25 P ) to obtain (26 P ). This corresponds to the expression in Section 5.4 where we provide interpretation.
B.2 Optimal policy with unemployment bene…ts
We now consider the case when hiring-cost subsidies are unavailable, and the government uses unemployment bene…ts in order to o¤set labor market distortions. As long as unemployment bene…ts are common in the two sectors, it would be impossible to decentralize the planner's allocation when 6 = 0 . We therefore consider the case with 0 = . In this case the comparison of (20)- (26) 1 4 We replace M with Q in the …nal equations, because it is simpler to discuss allocations in these terms.
In comparison to direct hiring subsidies, unemployment bene…ts attract more workers to the sector with the higher labor market frictions and therefore with the higher rate of unemployment. This e¤ect needs then to be neutralized by the adjustment of the optimal product market policies, as the above equations demonstrate.
B.3 Single instrument: unemployment bene…ts
From the above discussion it is clear that the constrained e¢ cient allocation is not feasible when the countries can use unemployment bene…ts as the only policy instruments. Therefore, the method used above to characterize optimal policies no longer applies. For this reason we directly search for the level of unemployment bene…ts that maximizes world welfare in a decentralized equilibrium.
Consider again a world of symmetric countries. The indirect utility function for a country is given by
where E is disposable household income (for details see . Unemployment bene…ts are …nanced by a lump-sum tax T on households, so that disposable income is E = ! 0 L T;
where ! 0 = x 0 b 0 is expected income in the economy. Finally, the government budget constraint can be written as lump-sum taxes equal total spending on unemployment bene…ts, or
Therefore, we numerically maximize welfare V with respect to b u ,
subject to the government budget constraint (27) , and with (b 0 ; x 0 ; x; Q; N ) determined as functions 1 5 Note that N = H=x and
To see this, note from (22)- (23) 
